We study the problem of illiquidity that afflicts the stocks listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (B.S.E.). Trading on a regular basis is concentrated in only a few of the listed stocks. We examine this issue by empirically looking at the characteristics of firms leading to differential levels of trading frequency and also, the resultant effect on average returns. Based on the study of a random sample of 250 firms over the five year period -1989 to 1993, we find evidence in favor of a liquidity premium for stocks on the B.S.E. Also, we find trading frequency is positively related to number of shareholders and shares outstanding. In addition, the ownership structure seems to matter, with concentration in the hands of insiders and government bodies having a deleterious effect on liquidity.
Introduction
In recent years, globalization of capital flows has led to the growing relevance of "Emerging Capital Markets". In particular, India is one of the countries with an expanding stock market that is attracting foreign funds. The Indian capital market has grown phenomenally due to the recently initiated liberalization process. For instance, between 1985 and 1992 the number of listed companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange (B.S.E.) increased from 4,344 to 6,480. In the same period, the market value of the listed companies increased from Rs.253 billion to Rs.3,541 billion (approximately US $110 billion). As a percentage of GNP, the market capitalization of the listed companies increased from 9.7% in 1985-86 to 57% in 1991-92. However, the stock markets in India are plagued by severe illiquidity with trading being very infrequent and concentrated in only a few stocks.
Around 85% of the trading volume on the B.S.E is from the Group 'A' securities which constitute about 88 companies. In fact, 32% of the volume is due to only the 10 most active issues. In contrast, Joseph (1990) estimates that about 25% of the listed companies do not trade even once a year. In this paper, we examine this issue by empirically looking at the characteristics of the firms leading to the differential levels of trading frequency and the resultant effect on average returns for the stocks on the B.S.E. Illiquidity as measured by the absence of continuous trading implies that there is an extreme mismatch between the available buyers and sellers at a given point in time. As early as 1968, Demsetz noted the possibility that the available pool of liquidity-motivated traders (who demand immediacy) may not arrive at the same time.
The consequent order imbalance can be cleared only if there exist traders who are willing to absorb the excess demand or supply at a price concession, of course. In other words, the traders who want to buy immediately can do so at a higher price and, similarly traders desiring immediate sale have to accept a lower price. In India the liquidity traders do not have this facility at this time, since there are neither any prearranged dealers for the stocks nor a mechanism for aggregating limit orders. Therefore, at a given time, if there are no liquidity-motivated traders on one side of the transaction, then one would expect no trade to occur.
For the New York Stock Exchange, Demsetz (1968) has shown that the probability of the arrival of a trader -the transaction rate -depends on the number of shareholders. Since then, other authors such as Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Glosten and Harris (1988) have used it as a proxy for the extent of liquidity traders for a particular stock. Recently, Bhide (1993) argues that liquidity of the stock can be enhanced by having a more diffused ownership but at the cost of good internal monitoring. Also, Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) make a distinction between long-term investors and short-term liquidity traders. The idea is that the ownership structure affects the level of liquidity of the stock. While several authors have used variables such as insider concentration as a proxy for the adverse-selection component of the bid-ask spreads, the effect of ownership structure on the level of liquidity has not been tested directly.
In this paper, we attempt to shed light on the factors causing differential levels of trading frequency on the B.S.E. by specifically focusing on ownership structure variables. Also, we investigate the effect of the lack of liquidity on the expected returns of the stocks. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) in a theoretical model predict a liquidity premium. We believe that our paper contributes to a better understanding of a hitherto relatively unresearched Emerging Market. Given the growing attention on India and its stock markets, the findings of this paper should be of interest to an international audience as well.
We conduct this study for a sample of 250 companies over a five year period -1989 to 1993. We find evidence in favor of a liquidity premium in the Indian market and that diffused stock ownership has a beneficial impact on the secondary market liquidity. Also, liquidity is adversely affected by larger insider holdings or by government and financial institutions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview of the Bombay Stock Exchange. In section 3, we discuss the implications of differential liquidity across stocks. The data and empirical results are presented in section 4. We offer our concluding comments in section 5.
An Overview of the Bombay Stock Exchange

4
The Bombay Stock Exchange (B.S.E) is the largest, most active stock market in India. It accounts for 65-70% of all transactions in value terms and about 80% of market capitalization. As of 1991, 6,400 companies were listed on this exchange. The total number of shareholders in India is estimated to be about 15 million.
Classification: Listed securities are classified into Group A and Group B categories.
Group A securities, also known as specified securities, can be traded with or without effecting deliveries. This facility called the Badla-system is equivalent to being able to short-sell and buy with borrowed capital. There are about 88 stocks in this category which contains the larger and more liquid stocks. Firms are selected by the B.S.E. Commission brokers are members who buy and sell orders on the floor of exchange on behalf of their clients. The brokerage is currently 2.5% of the value of the contract. Floor brokers are actually authorized assistants or sub-brokers and they execute orders for any members of the exchange. They receive a share in the brokerage fees paid by the client to the commission brokers.
mainly on their own account. They help to maintain a continuous market by standing ready to transact and charge a spread to compensate them for their services. However, they are under no obligation to give two-way quotes or act as a dealer continuously for any particular stock. Currently, market-making arrangements are not available for all stocks. Reliable time series data on spreads are unavailable. A survey conducted by Gupta (1992) shows that spreads ranged from 0.2 to 4.5% for Group A shares and from 0.3 to 30% for Group B shares.
Budliwalas, acting as financiers, lend securities to those who have sold short or lend money to those who need funds to take delivery of securities that they have share. On the settlement date, which is normally two weeks, XYZ sells for Rs.50 and the investor wishes to carry forward the transaction to the next settlement. However, stock exchange rules stipulate that all transactions conducted during an account period must be settled on the settlement date. So, the investor must find a financier to help her. Typically her broker will help her to find a budliwala. The budliwala finances an amount equal to the number of shares multiplied by the make-up price. (The make-up price is determined by the stock exchange authorities and is fairly close to the price on settlement day.) Assuming a make-up price Rs.50, the investor takes delivery of 1,000
shares by paying Rs.55,000. She provides Rs.5,000 and the budliwala puts up the other Rs.50,000. Now the investor sells the shares to the badla financier at the makeup price of Rs.50 and executes a resale contract for the subsequent settlement at a rate of Rs.50 plus the badla financing charge. For Group B shares, payment of money and physical delivery of shares takes place once in two weeks on the settlement date.
Implications of Differential Liquidity Across Stocks
Prior literature has focused on several definitions of liquidity. For instance, Lippman and McCall (1986) have defined liquidity in terms of the time that it takes to transact. Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) characterize a liquid market by its depth, breadth and resiliency. Depth refers to the existence of buy and sell orders near the current market price, breadth is the existence of orders in substantial volume, and resiliency is the responsiveness of new orders to price changes caused by short-term order flow imbalances. Other authors such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) define liquidity as the observable bid-ask spread. Bernstein (1987) reviews the various measures of liquidity and points out the pitfalls of using any single measure of liquidity.
The focus of this paper is on implications of differential liquidity on asset pricing and the effect of ownership structure on liquidity. Schwartz (1988) states that liquidity differs between assets traded within a market center. Such trading frictions have an impact on the price behavior of a security. Other factors being equal, thinly traded stocks are found to have wider bidask spreads and greater short-period price volatility. Also, market model beta coefficients are biased downwards. The issue of whether liquidity differences between assets traded within a market center have a substantial effect on asset prices is an important one. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) They analyze the role of a number of financial management policies and institutional 2 Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) raise some doubts regarding the robustness of the model using evidence with NYSE data. Krishnamurti and Park (1990) present evidence from the NASDAQ market to show that illiquid firms earn higher returns as compared to liquid firms all others being equal. They use trading volume as their measure of liquidity.
Liquidity and Asset Pricing
mechanisms in enhancing the secondary market liquidity of firms. The implication of these findings is that we need to move from the two-dimensional risk/return framework to a three-dimensional risk/return/liquidity framework.
There are several reasons why it is useful to study the relation between liquidity and asset pricing. Furthermore, the differences in liquidity across stocks are exacerbated by the B.S.E.
practice of categorizing stocks into two groups. It is therefore interesting to study whether, in spite of the differences in the market microstructure, there exists a liquidity premium in the Indian stock market.
Second, the study of liquidity in the Indian stock market, which is plagued by severe illiquidity problems, is likely to be useful to investors in making their investment decisions. Since 1993, Foreign Institutional Investors (FII) have been allowed to invest directly in the Indian stock market. FIIs find it useful to invest in Indian stocks on account of expectation of higher returns coupled with potential diversification benefits 3 . FIIs as of now only include the most liquid stocks in their portfolios.
Empirical evidence on the liquidity premium in the Indian stock market is likely to be informative for FIIs who would like to know the potential compensation for investing in the illiquid stocks.
Ownership Structure and Liquidity
Demsetz (1968) Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) study the role of the stock market as a monitor of managerial performance. The information content of stock prices improves with the liquidity of the secondary market. In a liquid market, speculators will devote more resources on monitoring since they will realize more of the potential gains.
Concentrated ownership reduces liquidity and hence the benefits of market monitoring reduction. Their expectation of higher returns is due to the higher GNP growth in India as compared to advanced industrialized countries.
will accrue to all shareholders. Thus, stock market liquidity is shown to have both a private and social value. Bhide (1993) argues that increased stock market liquidity due to diffused stock holding in the US markets has been achieved at the cost of good internal monitoring by block-holders. Currently, block-holders owning 10% or more of a firm's stock are This may be one main reason for many stocks to list on the B.S.E. even though they have very few shares owned by outsiders. Consequently, there is little information put out by these companies nor any actual trading in the secondary markets. Joseph (1990) finds that for about 50% of the stocks which did not trade even once a year, there is no publicly available earnings or dividend information! However, ownership in stocks has also been concentrated in the hands of insiders, government and financial institutions. Typically, about 40% of shares were held by insiders and about 15%-20% by financial institutions and government. At the extreme, public sector companies were wholly owned by the government of India and were absolutely illiquid. Even in larger private sector companies, it was not unusual to find governmental nominees sitting on the board of directors. The effect of ownership concentration on stock market liquidity in the Indian context has not been empirically studied.
Recently, the regulatory agency, Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), has started permitting private placement of stocks, increased the minimum amount of investment in public issues, and allowed companies to raise capital from Euro-Issues.
These measures undermine the secondary market liquidity of stocks. An ostensible reason for these measures is to allow companies to raise capital at lower issue costs.
But adequate attention has not been given to the potential adverse impact of these measures on the liquidity of stocks. We provide evidence on the effect of stock ownership patterns on liquidity in the Indian market which is plagued by extreme illiquidity.
Data and Empirical Results
Data on stock prices were obtained from the database of Dateline and Research
Technologies Limited (DART). The DART database covers nearly 2,000 companies out of a total of nearly 6,000 listed companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange. The price data are available in computer-readable form and cover the period July 1988-June 1993. The data on shareholding pattern were obtained from DART and the Bombay Stock Exchange directory. The shareholding data contain the following variables:
Percentages held by insiders, public, and governmental financial institutions; total number of shares outstanding; and number of shareholders.
Sample
We selected 250 companies randomly from the 2,000 companies in the DART database. The price data were collected from the DART database while the ownership information was hand-collected from the B.S.E. directory as of the end of each year in our sample. Companies belonging to both Group A and Group B were selected to make our sample representative of the population as much as possible. Companies not in the DART database are likely to be infrequently traded stocks especially of small companies. Therefore, our sample systematically excludes the most illiquid stocks. All the currently available Indian databases (in computer-readable form) will quite likely suffer from the same bias.
Methodology
For each company included in the sample, we compute the monthly returns 4 for the period July 1989 to June 1993. We measure the liquidity of a stock by its trading frequency. Traditional liquidity measures such as bid-ask spread and trading volume are not available for Indian stocks 5 . We measure trading frequency as the ratio of the number of days the particular stock traded to the total number of days on which the stock exchange operated during each year.
Empirical Results
the impact of trading frequency on stock returns. Trading frequency and average monthly returns are computed once a year. We regress the average monthly returns of a particular stock on its trading frequency during the previous year. Firms are allowed to "die-out" in the middle of the year to avoid survivorship bias. Thus the actual number of stocks in a particular year will be in general less than 250. The results of regression I reported below indicate the existence of a liquidity premium for the most illiquid stocks. The negative coefficient for the trading frequency variable (Tra_Frq) is statistically significant at conventional levels (t = -2.71, p-value = .007). In this study we do not control for systematic risk and bid-ask spread. Due to infrequency of trading, we are unable to obtain the required number of data points for estimating the beta of the most illiquid stocks. Furthermore, the evidence of Fama and French (1992) indicates that control for size is more important than that of systematic risk 6 . We next regress average monthly returns on the trading frequency and the number of shareholders. The number of shareholders is a proxy for the transaction rate according to Demsetz (1968) . According to him, there exists an approximate linear relationship between the number of transactions and the number of shareholders.
We wish to test the relative importance of the liquidity proxies viz., trading frequency and number of shareholders. The results which are shown in regression III indicate significance for the trading frequency variable but the number of shareholders variable is not statistically significant. We regress trading frequency on number of shares outstanding and show the outcome in regression IV below. The number of shares outstanding has a positive effect on the trading frequency and the relation is statistically significant. We next regress trading frequency on number of shareholders and report the results in regression V. A strong statistically significant positive relation exists between trading frequency and the number of shareholders. Our results conform with those of Demsetz (1968) and Bhide (1993) . This study also pinpoints the effects of "long-term" investors, namely, insider holdings, and holdings of financial institutions and government. Issue costs are lowered when shares are sold to insiders, and to government and financial institutions, but at the cost of reduced liquidity. The ostensible argument for increasing the insiderownership is better monitoring. Measurement of the benefit of improved monitoring versus the cost of reduced liquidity is another fruitful area for further research.
